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Abstract:  
This article seeks to identify the conditions that prompt executives and legislators to reform 
electoral laws, especially those with far-ranging and redistributive consequences. It pursues this 
objective by evaluating the ability of alternative models of political behaviour and institutional 
reform to account for the promulgation of the 1946 Electoral Code in Costa Rica, one of the 
oldest and most stable democracies in Latin America and in the world, more generally. The 1946 
Electoral Code, among other reasons, merits study because its enactment threatened to loosen the 
governing party's grip on the presidency in the 1948 elections and promised to eradicate — if not 
reduce — its majority in Congress in the 1946 midterm as well as 1948 elections. 
 
A central conclusion of this article is that, contrary to some recent critiques of strategic models 
of institutional change, the inability of legislative seat maximization or career protection models 
to explain the promulgation of the 1946 Electoral Code does not mean that rational choice 
theories cannot account for the reform of electoral laws. By developing a third model that 
focuses upon the interest incumbents have in promoting political stability, this article shows that 
the creation of institutions that promise to punish key sectors of the ruling bloc is prompted, in 
part, by the threat of a civil war that at least some incumbents fear losing' The establishment of 
institutions with such redistributive repercussions also stems from the willingness of some within 
the ruling bloc to fashion a new alliance with those in the opposition who also share an interest in 
political stability. 
 
Article: 
                                                 

  Major portions of the research upon which this article is based were made possible by an International Doctoral 
Research Fellowship furnished by the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned 
Societies' I acknowledge the help of Benjamin Núñez, Vilma Pena, and Sara Soto Orozco, who helped me to collect 
much of primary source data referenced in this essay. Ivan Molina Jimenez and Mark P' Jones made useful 
suggestions on penultimate versions of this paper' Finally, I thank Torben Iversen tor several lengthy conversations 
about the themes found in this article as well as his willingness to comment upon an earlier version of it. 
Consolidating a democratic regime requires creating a set of institutions guaranteeing the 
sanctity of the vote as well as commanding the respect of all social and political forces. As the 
1990 Nicaraguan and the 1994 El Salvadoran elections demonstrate, electoral contests that are 
perceived as fair can contribute to settling longstanding conflicts. That most Latin American 
countries are now undergoing efforts to reform electoral laws (see, for example, Nohlen, 1993) 
reveals how important such issues have become in the aftermath of transitions to democracy. 
 
Creating institutions that are valued by political parties and the citizenry at large, however, is 
rarely accomplished easily. The longer incumbents have been in power, the less likely they are to 
be willing to reform political arrangements that preserve their influence on the executive and 
legislative branches of government. As the implementation of far-reaching electoral reform bills, 
for example, in Italy (1993), Japan (1993), and Venezuela (1988-89) indicates, hegemonic 
parties can be coaxed into accepting or forced to accept unpalatable institutional changes. Why? 
 
This article assesses alternative responses to this question by examining the promulgation of an 
Electoral Code in Costa Rica in 1946. By precluding the use of fraud in elections (and by 
creating a closed-list version of proportional representation), it has assured both incumbents and 
opposition movements that participation in the electoral arena is regulated by a set of impartially 
administered laws. As the cornerstone of existing electoral legislation in Costa Rica (Hernández 
Valle, 1990),
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 the 1946 Electoral Code thus has contributed to the development of one of the 
most stable democratic regimes in the world (Ameringer, 1982; Booth, 1989; Lehoucq, 1992; 
1993). 
 
Analysis of the enactment of this electoral reform bill is also germane because it was sponsored 
by an incumbent party that stood to benefit from the use of electoral fraud. In an environment 
characterized by uncertainty, the enactment of this bill threatened to cost the governing PRN 
(National Republican Party) the presidency in the 1948 elections and promised to eradicate its 
majority in Congress in the 1946 midterm as well as 1948 elections. Why did so many PRN 
politicians help to establish institutions not in their own self-interest? 
 
Assuming, for example, that parties are motivated by the desire to maximize votes, along with 
their control of executive and legislative posts, appears to explain why many PRN legislative 
deputies loyal to ex-President Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia (1940-44) tried to derail passage 
of the Electoral Code. Widely suspected of having employed fraud and coercion to install 
Teodoro Picado Michalski on the presidency in the 1944 elections, Calderón Guardia had 
become a highly controversial politician. Maintaining control of Congress was a key element of 
what many suspected to be Calderón Guardia's efforts to return to the presidency in the 1948 
elections. Under existing constitutional statutes—and in no way altered by the proposed 
Electoral Code—Congress retained the authority to judge the validity of election results. 
 
Narrowly self-interested models of party and deputy behaviour, however, cannot satisfactorily 
explain why some PRN deputies belonging to the `Calderonista' faction (loyal to Calder& 
Guardia) of the PRN did endorse electoral reform. Nor can they account for President Picado 
Michalski's decision to send Congress the Electoral Code reform bill. Neither can they delineate 
why some members of the main opposition party, the PD (Democratic Party), rejected a reform 
bill that promised to increase their numbers in Congress. 
 
According to political sociologists (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Kitschelt, 1992; and Lipset, 1992, 
for recent statements), the inability of this account to make sense of the behaviour of the 
president and of important legislative factions undermines standard rational choice explanations 
of institutional change. The importance of this model, such critics contend, underscores the need 
to show how values and other cognitive factors shape the decision-making of politicians. If these 
criticisms are sound, then recent efforts to develop rationalist explanations of institutions 
(Knight, 1992; Tsebelis, 1990), at best, are of limited utility. 
 
Without denying the importance of studying these sociological factors, I show how a more 
thorough specification of the divergent interests held by politicians can furnish rational choice 
models capable of explaining the perplexing decisions made by key Costa Rican politicians in 
the mid-1940s. Most importantly, I accomplish this objective without disregarding the 
shortcomings of the most popular rational choice explanation—what I call the legislative 
maximization model—of instutitional change. Neither do I succumb to the temptation of creating 
an ill- defined and hence arbitrary notion of self-interest to rescue this model of political reform 
that I also demonstrate is of limited utility. 
 
My principal contention is that the creation of institutions that promise to punish key sectors of 
the ruling bloc is prompted in part by the threat of a civil war that at least some incumbents fear 
losing. Though hardliners ultimately succeeded in igniting a civil war between the government 
and opposition, the 1946 Electoral Code stands as the most notable achievement of pro- and anti-
regime moderates to thwart the polarization of Costa Rican politics in the mid-1940s (Lehoucq, 
1992, pp. 247-74)' The establishment of institutions with such redistributive consequences also 
stems from the willingness of some within the ruling bloc to fashion a new alliance—what 
George Tsebelis (1990) calls a new deal coalition—with those in opposition with whom they 
share an interest in political stability. 
 
In the first part of this article, I examine existing research on the origins as well as the 
consequences of electoral reform. I then outline alternative interpretations of institutional reform 
and discuss the key reforms contained by the Electoral Code project. In the main section of this 
article, I evaluate the plausibility of these models of electoral reform by discerning their ability to 
explain the behaviour of politicians confronted with the task of preserving or transforming the 
electoral laws then in existence in Costa Rica. I conclude this article by summarizing my 
findings, then by discussing their implications for theories of institutional change and, finally, by 
assessing its impact on Costa Rican politics. 
 
Perspectives on the Origins of Electoral Laws 
Although much is (and more needs to be) known about the consequences of electoral laws, 
significantly less is known about the origins of electoral laws. Scattered findings do not even 
debate the veracity of a claim analogous to Duverger's Law (1954; 1986)—the proposition that 
multi-member districts using proportional representation tend to generate multi-party systems 
while single- member, plurality districts tend to produce two-party systems. Students of the 
effects of electoral laws at least are debating the role of district magnitude, electoral formulas, 
balloting procedures, and the like on party systems and political behaviour (Grofman and 
Lijphart, 1986; Katz, 1980; Lijphart, 1990, 1993; Lijphart and Grofman, 1984; Rae, 1971; Riker, 
1982; Sartori, 1986; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989). 
 
The Genesis of Electoral Laws 
Rationalist Accounts of Electoral Reform: Several studies contend that electoral laws are the 
products of negotiations between incumbents and their opponents (Bawn, 1992; Brady and Mo, 
1992), each of whom is trying to maximize their legislative representation. Another, much more 
speculative effort (Geddes, 1990), argues that preferences over electoral laws, along with 
constitutional and other institutional arrangements, are driven by the desire of politicians to 
protect and to further their careers.
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 Yet another analyst (Shugart, 1992) suggests that electoral 
reform is the outcome of a struggle that includes party leaders as well as rank and file, each of 
whom are constrained by the preferences of their constituents. 
 
Criticisms of Rational Choice Approaches: It is undoubtedly true that actors with such easily 
identifiable preferences play an important role in the design of electoral laws. It is equally true, 
however, that those who promulgate far-reaching electoral laws may hold more complex reasons 
for doing so, especially if such institutional changes threaten the future political standing of 
consenting parties. 
 
In an effort to understand choices over electoral laws in eleven southern and East European 
countries, for example, Kitschelt (1992) contends that the assumption of maximizing legislative 
representation cannot account for why politicians in Bulgaria, Hungary and Spain adopting 
systems of proportional representation. In these countries, plurality or majoritiarian electoral 
systems, Kitschelt argues, could have cemented the stranglehold of two predominant parties. On 
the basis of these and other observations, Kitschelt (1992, p. 28) concludes that rational choice 
accounts do not 'perform very well when they are applied to situations in which relatively little 
information about the actors' payoffs is available and in which strategic interaction may be rather 
complicated across sets of actors over time.' 
 
One way to circumvent the limitations of perhaps the most straightforward rational choice 
account of institutional design is to complement, as Kitschelt recommends, such models with 
sociological and cultural explanatory variables. Choices over electoral laws, he suggests, might 
also have much to do with the number of cleavages existing in a society and with 'precedent in 
one's own country's history or the experience of some other successful model' (Kitschelt, 1992, 
p. 27). Students on institutional reform therefore should examine how social structural and 
cognitive constraints shape the preferences of politicians confronted with the choice of 
maintaining or transforming electoral laws. 
 
Reformulating Rational Choice Accounts: Another route to a robust explanation of 
institutional reform is to modify what is an admittedly narrow interpretation of the motivations of 
politicians contemplating reform of electoral laws without jettisoning the core assumptions of a 
rational choice explanation of political behaviour. Such explanations rely upon a notion of 
instrumental, or what Elster (1983) calls „thin', rationality, and, as a consequence, the proposition 
that individuals pursue a course of action optimal in the light of all the constraints they face. 
 
 
That politicians make choices at odds with their interest in maximizing their legislative 
representation may reveal nothing more than that an analyst has not identified all of the arenas in 
which politicians compete. The behaviour of parties that seems irrational or extra-rational 
therefore is not necessarily conclusive evidence that rational choice theories cannot explain 
institutional reform (Tsebelis, 1990). Seemingly bizarre political decision-making perhaps 
indicates that the design of electoral laws often involves actors competing in a variety of political 
arenas where they must make less than ideal trade-offs among choices over institutional 
arrangements. 
 
Alternative Models of Electoral Reform 
By examining why many within the PRN—the majority party in Costa Rica during the 1940s—
endorsed the 1946 Electoral Code, this article shows how the existence of a multiplicity of arenas 
often generates contradictory choices for politicians confronted with the task of maintaining or 
transforming prevailing institutions' Before analysing the politics of electoral reform in the light 
of these arguments, I outline three distinct rational choice models of political behaviour and 
institutional reform in order to show how different assumptions about the goals of politicians 
stem from identifying some, but not necessarily all, of the arenas that they inhabit' Each 
hypothesizes how politicians should behave when confronted with the choice of transforming the 
rules regulating access to key state offices. 
 
Maximizing Legislative Influence: Perhaps the most obvious explanation of the decision to 
endorse or to reject the electoral reform made by deputies focuses on the impact of the Electoral 
Code on the legislative standing of parties. It assumes that parties wish to maximize their 
legislative representation in order to be able to convert their preferences into policy' Support of 
the Electoral Code thus would have stemmed from parties that would have increased their 
strength in Congress' Conversely, opposition to electoral reform would have been organized by 
those parties who expected the promulgation of the Electoral Code to decrease their power in the 
legislature. Both hypotheses can he derived from some of the most popular accounts of the 
behaviour of parties and represent perhaps the most straightforward version of a rational choice 
explanation of institutional change.
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Protecting Political Careers: Examining the effects of the Electoral Code on the political 
careers of individual deputies is another way to understand why some deputies opposed the 
proposed legislation while others endorsed it. Deputies dependent upon corrupt political 
machines for election to Congress would vote against a bill that threatened to eliminate the use of 
electoral fraud. Conversely, deputies that do not rely upon fraudulent methods to be elected to 
Congress would not oppose a bill that was principally aimed at creating rules to guarantee the 
fairness of electoral competition. 
 
Both hypotheses are consistent with existing research on political gerrymandering and on how 
incumbents seek to design rules aimed at protecting their hold on public office (Grofman et al., 
1982; Grofman, 1990). They also represent derivations of rational choice explanations of 
political behaviour: they suggest that congressmen dependent upon the manufacture of electoral 
fraud by political machines will hinder reform of electoral laws that seek to detect and punish 
transgressors of fair electoral practices. 
 
The Promotion of Political Stability: The final explanation of electoral reform assessed in this 
article focuses upon the consequences of the non-enactment of fundamental institutional changes 
on the survival of incumbents. It suggests that governments rarely alter the rules and institutions 
that brought them to power and that promise to cement their hold on the state. Some within the 
ruling bloc will favour far-reaching reforms only when, in the first place, they become convinced 
that the failure to reform the rules regulating access to state office will provoke a civil war that 
they might lose. Incumbents, in the second place, will push for such changes when at least some 
within the ruling bloc believe that compromising with a sector of the opposition promises to 
create a new and hopefully dominant set of alliances in politics—what Tsebelis (1990) calls a 
new deal coalition. 
 
This explanation is consistent with common sense regarding political behaviour. Governments 
historically have, in part, implemented far-reaching reforms only under pressure of military 
defeat. They also have supported reform when doing so promises to cement a coalition with key 
political sectors. By concentrating upon the concern of political survival possessed by every 
government, this model of reform also constitutes a rational choice explanation of political 
behaviour, though of a more sophisticated sort. 
 
The Scope of the 1946 Electoral Code 
In his 1944 state-of-the-nation address to Congress, President Picado Michalski announced his 
intention to overhaul existing electoral legislation. Over the next year and a half, his Secretary of 
the Interior (Gobernación), Fernando Soto Harrison, selected a number of distinguished 
magistrates to form a commission to draft a new Electoral Registry and encouraged the 
formation of a legislative commission to write a new set of electoral laws for Costa Rica. 
 
The Electoral Code was drafted by three deputies selected by the Director of Congress, each of 
whom was to have belonged to one of the three principal parties represented in Congress. For 
unknown reasons, opposition Deputy Victor Manuel Elizondo resigned from the commission on 
11 January 1945 and was replaced by the First Alternate of the Province of Heredia, Juan 
Rodriguez Ulloa (PRN) (CC, ES No. 66 [11 January 1945], art. 2). The Special Commission, 
comprised of Deputies Francisco Fonseca Chamier (PRN), Luis Carballo Corrales (PVP) and 
Rodriguez Ulloa, not only refashioned every aspect of existing Costa Rican electoral legislation, 
but also included a slightly amended draft law for a new registry of voters prepared by three 
magistrates which was presented to Congress on 15 March 1945 (Proyecto [28 June 1945]).
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With two exceptions, this draft project did not aim to alter the closed-list, largely proportional 
representational system of electoral laws then existing in Costa Rica.
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 Under prevailing electoral 
laws, only parties in the provinces sending three or more representatives to Congress that 
achieved what was called a 'quotient' (cociente)— a figure produced by dividing the total number 
of popular votes by contested legislative seats—could obtain congressional posts for which no 
party had a quotient. Minorities that failed to meet the quotient were excluded from competing 
for left-over legislative seats (el sistema de arrastre), even if their vote totals were greater than 
the residual number of votes held by larger parties. Indeed, the existing electoral law favoured 
the parties with the largest number of votes on the occasions when such seats needed to be 
distributed. 
 
Under the proposed Electoral Code, however, all legislative seats in the seven provinces would 
be distributed by the least remainders system of proportional representation. Thus, minority as 
well as majority parties in each province (including those with fewer than two contested seats) 
with the largest number of votes and at least 75 per cent of a quotient struggled to obtain 
unaccounted seats.
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The proposed law mainly aimed to eliminate the president's discretionary authority in electoral 
matters by severely circumscribing his ability to manipulate his powers of appointment and of 
adjudication as well as to eradicate the ability of pro- as well as anti-government parties to 
manufacture fraudulent votes. Its principal innovations included renaming and strengthening the 
authority of the Grand Electoral Council—an institution created in 1925 to supervise the 
organization of electoral contests. The newly-created National Electoral Tribunal (TNE) was to 
consist of three members and their alternates, one of each was to be selected by the executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches of government. Among other responsibilities, the TNE 
determined the composition of provincial electoral juntas and was entrusted with settling 
conflicting claims regarding the implementation of the Electoral Code. Most importantly, the 
TNE held the responsibility of issuing a provisional verdict on the results of elections, which 
then were to be accepted or rejected by an extraordinary session of Congress on 1 March, 
approximately three weeks after election day.
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To ensure that incumbent parties did not possess an unfair political advantage, the Electoral 
Code permitted representatives of all registered parties to play a role in every aspect of the 
electoral process. Parties were empowered to supervise the registration of voters, the printing of 
ballots and, most importantly, to certify the initial tally of the vote conducted at each polling 
station. To prevent any individual from voting more than once on election day, the Electoral 
Code also advocated the suppression of absentee balloting (votos a computar). Citizens were no 
longer permitted to cast their ballots outside of their district of residence. Henceforth, only 
members of polling stations, party election observers and scribes could, with appropriate 
certification, cast ballots outside of their home districts. The creation of a new Electoral Registry 
also sought to prevent citizens from voting on more than one occasion by assembling an accurate 
list of individuals entitled to vote and by endowing each citizen with a photographic 
identification card. Estimates suggest that absentee balloting, faulty electoral rolls and defective 
forms of personal identification had permitted, by the mid-1940s, both government and 
opposition forces to inflate vote totals by as much as 40,000 to 60,000 ballots—a number 
approximately equal to a fourth to a third of the registered electorate (Lehoucq, 1992, pp' 181, 
318-19). 
 
The electoral reform bill sponsored by President Picado Michalski thus severely limited the use 
of fraud, both by pro- and anti-government forces. No longer would governments be able to 
manufacture fraudulent voter identification cards to inflate vote totals received by officially-
sponsored movements' Neither would governments or their opponents be able to purchase 
identification cards so that their loyal followers could vote more than once on election day. By 
ensuring that official election observers from each registered party must approve of the initial 
tally of the vote conducted at every polling station, the Electoral Code prevented pro-government 
officials and parties from contaminating electoral results at the expense of antigovernment 
forces. 
 
Legislative Supporters and Opponents of the Electoral Reform 
President Picado Michalski possessed few allies in his attempt to gain congressional approval of 
these reforms. In the 1944-46 legislature, he could count upon the support of not more than 10 
PRN congressmen, some of whom were his followers, 
 
others who were neither loyal calderonistas or picadistas (Lane, 7 August 1944; Johnson, 5 June 
1945). Like the president, an unknown portion of these deputies realized that the promulgation of 
electoral reforms would increase their prestige and might even improve their future political 
standing. How the PRN deputy backing the principal opposition leader, Leon Cortes Castro, 
would behave was also uncertain: as a member of the majority party, he would be inclined to 
oppose reform. As a follower of Cortes Castro, however, he might decide to endorse a bill that 
increased guarantees for the opposition leader. 
 
The president probably would be able to rely upon most of the thirteen opposition congressmen, 
who also believed that they could attract a substantially larger number of votes if existing 
electoral safeguards were reinforced. Finally, President Picado Michalski was supported by the 
four representatives of the PVP, Costa Rica's communist party and the PRN's principal ally since 
1943 (Contreras and Cerdas, 1988; Miller, 1993). Puzzling to domestic critics of anti-
communism, the PVP's stance was motivated, in part, by a concern to free itself of dependence 
on PRN: under an effective set of electoral safeguards, the PVP expected to increase its share of 
the popular vote. More importantly, the PVP also realized that the Electoral Code promised to 
augment its representation in Congress even if its level of electoral support did not change, 
because it, like other minorities, would no longer be excluded from competing for legislative 
posts left after such seats were allocated to those parties that had reached one or more quotients. 
 
The obstacle blocking the passage of the Electoral Code was the recalcitrance, if not the outright 
hostility, of many loyal calderonista PRN deputies. An effective set of electoral guarantees 
meant that public offices would be allocated to those who successfully appealed to voters. In 
elections where the stuffing of ballot boxes would be detected more easily, the uncertainty of 
electoral outcomes would increase substantially. 
 
Evaluating the Veracity of Alternative Accounts of Electoral Reform 
Assessing the strengths and weaknesses of these interpretations is not an easy task, in large part 
because many politicians remained careful not to disclose their preferences regarding electoral 
reform nor to publicize their assessments about the consequences of electoral reform. 
Nevertheless, sufficient evidence exists to determine the ability of alternative models of reform 
to furnish coherent explanations of the promulgation of the 1946 Electoral Code. In what 
follows, I rely upon Costa Rican newspapers, minutes of congressional sessions published in La 
Gaceta and memoirs to identify the strengths and weaknesses of these explanations' I have also 
used the reports and despatches produced by US Embassy officials that often contain valuable 
and previously classified material on Costa Rican politics during the 1940s.
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The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Legislative Maximization Thesis 
The first explanation is supported by the fact that calderonista deputies submitted a large number 
of amendments-108 out of 134 or 76 per cent of the total—to delay, if not to prevent, the 
promulgation of the Electoral Code (Mociones [4, 5 & 7 August 1945]). 
 
Most ominously, they suggested that the Electoral Code include a provision to extend suffrage 
rights to women. By provoking a lengthy debate in Congress, this motion was a killer 
amendment because it threatened to sink the Electoral Code. If approved, the president would be 
forced to veto the entire electoral reform package on constitutional grounds. After a thorough 
study of this matter, the Board of Directors of the College of Lawyers, Costa Rica's most 
distinguished legal association, had concluded that furnishing women with the right to vote 
required a reform of the constitution—a change that required approval of two-thirds of all 
deputies in two different sessions of the legislature (Informe (8 October 1945)). As several 
reporters for La prensa libre (21 September 1945) noted, those in favour of electoral reform were 
placed in the paradoxical position of opposing suffrage rights for women if they did not want to 
delay—if not prevent—the approval of the Electoral Code. 
 
The validity of this explanation is also underscored by the fact that the opposition to electoral 
reform was so intense that the Electoral Code was not endorsed in time for the 1946 mid-term 
elections. Anti-reform deputies only agreed, in late 1945, to furnish the PD with representation 
on provincial Electoral Juntas, to increase the power and number of PD election observers on 
district-level polling stations and to allow the three branches of government to select the 
members of the Grand Electoral Council. They did not, most significantly, endorse a motion 
restricting voting rights only to those citizens with photographic identification cards. 9 That 
widespread dislike of electoral reform led the Secretary of Gobernaci On, Fernando Soto 
Harrison, to threaten his resignation on repeated occasions also reinforces the appeal of this 
interpretation of the enactment of the Electoral Code (Johnson, 19 November 1945). 
 
It is a mistake, however, to conclude that the interest possessed by parties to maximize their 
legislative influence explains the behaviour of their deputies. At most, this explanation identifies 
some of the most important reasons why PVP and most opposition deputies struggled to enact 
the Electoral Code. It also explains why most calderonista PRN representatives consistently 
voted against this bill and why, after its passage became assured, they sought to delay its 
promulgation. 
 
The most glaring flaws in this explanation consist of its inability to explain why some 
calderonista PRN deputies backed a reform presumably inimical to the interests of their party 
and why a handful of PD deputies opposed the passage of a bill that promised to expand their 
presence in Congress. The overall utility of this explanation is also undermined by President 
Picado Michalski's decision to seek approval of such a wide-sweeping package of electoral 
reforms. As a leading member of the PRN-dominated government, his ability to gain legislative 
approval of his programme would only decrease as larger numbers of opposition deputies were 
sent to Congress. His behaviour also angered Calderón Guardia and his faction of the PRN, 
which represented his principal source of political support. 
 
Only if the 1946 Electoral Code had never been enacted could it be concluded that this 
explanation is valid. But if this outcome had been obtained, it would have been incorrect to 
suggest that the desire of parties to maximize their legislative influence explains the behaviour of 
Costa Rican legislators in the mid-1940s. Their decision either to support or oppose electoral 
reform could also have stemmed from the desire of individual legislators to protect their careers. 
 
The Strengths and Weakness of the Political Career Protection Thesis 
Not all calderonista deputies actively participated in the fight against the electoral reform. In line 
with the second interpretation of electoral reform, support for the electoral reform bill perhaps 
did stem from calderonista deputies who felt that their future political careers were not imperilled 
by the enactment of the proposed reform. Though La Gaceta reports of the third and final vote of 
the Electoral Code only disclose that this bill was passed by 'a large majority' (CC, ES No. 65 
(20 December 1945), art. 4), earlier votes on what were killer amendments reveal that support for 
the Electoral Code was uncertain, but did include some calderonista deputies. 
 
The killer amendment introduced by Deputy Pablo Mercedes Rodriguez Rodriguez (PRN), 
which aimed to repeal the secret franchise, was the most daunting challenge faced by pro-reform 
politicians. Many congressmen appear to have supported this measure as a way of crippling a bill 
that promised to eliminate existing ways of manufacturing fraudulent votes, even if its sponsors 
were motivated by the sincerely-held belief that public voting was suitable for Costa Rica. 
Analysis of the debate and its results thus sheds light on the utility of the political career protec-
tion thesis of electoral reform. 
 
Roll Call Analysis: Debate on this amendment began on 26 September when Deputies José 
Maria Pinaud Pinaud (an independent-minded member of the PRN) and Rodriguez Rodriguez 
defended the superiority of the public over the secret franchise. Deputy Rodriguez Rodriguez, in 
particular, pointed out that the absence of the secret franchise had not prevented citizens from 
voicing their opinions nor in electing candidates disliked by the government, including Ricardo 
Jimenez Oreamuno's first election to the presidency in 1910. Deputy Pinaud Pinaud also 
underscored the fact that fraud had not disappeared from Costa Rican elections, even though the 
secret franchise has existed since 1925. 
 
One of the authors of the Electoral Code project, Deputy Rodriguez Ulloa (PRN), responded by 
pointing out that fraud stemmed from the imperfections of existing electoral legislation, not from 
the secret franchise. He argued that Pinaud Pinaud's speech had failed to discuss all of the 
safeguards created by the Electoral Code to ensure that fraud would not remain undetected and to 
enforce the privacy of each citizen's vote (CC, ES No. 7 (26 September 1945), art. 3). In a 
subsequent session of Congress, his words were echoed by another author of the Electoral Code, 
Deputy Carballo Corrales (PVP), who perhaps most clearly articulated the principal drawbacks 
of any system of public voting (CC, ES No. 8 (27 September 1945), art. 4): 
 
It has been said that the system of secret voting is very corrupt' But public voting only reinforces 
the powerful; amplifies the power of the individual who can purchase votes; and strengthens the 
power of the plantation owner who has an interest in the triumph of his candidate because he 
benefits from such a victory' Confident that his candidate will win in his district and on his 
plantation, he ensures that his candidate receives enough votes to obtain the favors he desires. 
 
Like all defenders of the secret franchise, Deputy Carballo Corrales knew that its repeal would 
only magnify the level of fraud practiced in any election. 
 
After the motion presented by Deputy Rodriguez Rodriguez was discussed in several 
congressional sessions, it was subject to a vote on 1 October. By a vote of 21 to 17, those in 
favour of dismantling the secret franchise had won (CC, ES No' 10 (1 October 1945), art. 4). 
Hoping to reverse this decision, Deputy Rodriguez Ulloa the next day presented a motion of 
revision, which required that congressmen again cast ballots on the matter. After a brief 
discussion of the merits of public and secret voting, a majority of one revoked the attempt to 
repeal the secret franchise: by receiving 22 votes, Deputy Rodriguez Rodriguez's motion almost 
succeeded in withstanding the onslaught mounted by 23 of his colleagues (CC, ES No. 11 (2 
October 1945), art. 3). 
 
Disaggregation of these roll-call votes, as summarized in Fig. 2, indicates that even if most PRN 
deputies voted to re-establish public voting, many of their colleagues, whether calderonista or 
independent-minded, did not. In the first vote, for example, 14 calderonista deputies voted in 
favour of this motion while 13 voted in its favour during the second roll-call vote. On both days, 
however, calderonista deputies voted against repealing the secret franchise, though in much 
fewer numbers. Only six and seven deputies backed efforts to defeat this motion on the first and 
second roll-call votes, respectively. In both votes, independent-minded PRN 
 
deputies split their support of this measure. They endorsed the secret franchise by a vote of two 
to three and four to three on the first and second votes, respectively. 
 
Fig. 2 also shows that the only party to have voted consistently in favour of preserving the secret 
franchise was the PVP. Even opposition deputies did not all vote to prevent the re-establishment 
of public voting. During the first roll-call vote, three opposition deputies endorsed Deputy 
Rodriguez Rodriguez's motion while five did not. In the last vote, four opposition deputies voted 
in favour of this amendment while eight voted against it. 
 
Analysis of the debate and roll-call votes on abolishing the secret franchise suggests that not all 
PRN deputies—not even all calderonista deputies—opposed the enactment of the Electoral 
Code. Most, however, did vote to re-establish public voting, perhaps because they wished to 
undermine a bill that threatened to increase the uncertainty of electoral outcomes. That some PD 
deputies also voted with a majority of PRN deputies indicates that the overhaul of electoral laws 
unnerved many politicians, not just those benefiting from the control of electoral machinery. 
 
Like the first explanation of electoral reform, the political career protection thesis cannot explain 
why President Picado Michalski sponsored such far-reaching legislation. Promoting fairness in 
electoral competition not only angered the calderonistas, but also threatened to weaken his 
party's control of Congress. Why was the president in favour of transforming electoral 
institutions that promised to boost the institutional influence of the opposition? Why did enough 
calderonista PRN deputies join the opposition and PVP representatives to enact the Electoral 
Code? 
 
The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Political Stability Thesis 
Whatever their motivation, all calderonista deputies—including those whose political survival 
did not hinge upon the use of fraud—and Calderón Guardia faced a set of undesirable choices. 
They could support the electoral reform and experience a decline in their electoral strength and 
hence their share of state power. Alternatively, calderonista PRN deputies could block passage of 
the Electoral Code and provoke a confrontation with the opposition. The ex-president and his 
legislative supporters undoubtedly realized that the failure to strengthen electoral safeguards left 
the opposition with no alternative but to mobilize its supporters in a general strike or even to 
organize a revolt against the government. 
 
The Institutional Bases of Political Stability in Costa Rica: Elsewhere (Lehoucq, 1992, chap. 3; 
1993), I demonstrated that the incentives facing Costa Rican politicians were structured by the 
struggle to gain and to retain control of the executive branch of government. Though many 
parties competed for legislative and executive offices, only one party actually captured the 
presidency in quadrennially- scheduled contests. Unless outgoing and incoming presidents 
permitted their rivals to sit in the legislature, those who had lost the presidential election might 
he tempted to use violence to gain control of the state. Democratic stability emerged in Costa 
Rica as presidents recognized that access to the legislative branch of government undercut the 
size of coalitions willing to organize coups against incumbents. 
 
The Emergence of Instability by the 1940s: President Calderón Guardia's unwillingness to 
permit his opponents to win public office upset the delicate balance of power responsible for 
maintaining political stability in Costa Rica' The election of Picado Michalski to the presidency 
in 1944 was widely perceived as a product of Calderón Guardia's machinations, even if analysis 
of these electoral outcomes reveals that officially-sponsored fraud may have contributed to but 
not have been responsible for his electoral victory (Lehoucq, 1992, pp. 187-94). Equally destabi-
lizing was the marginalization of the opposition in the legislature: Fig. 1 discloses that the PRN 
and the PVP controlled approximately three-quarters of the seats in the 1944-46 sessions of 
Congress. Not surprisingly, rumours began to circulate that those without a stake in prevailing 
institutional arrangements has begun contemplating the use of force to topple President Picado 
Michalski. 
 
Despised by many and unsure of the extent of the PRN and PVP's support of his government, 
Picado Michalski had to make one of two choices' By strengthening the alliance with the 
calderonista faction of the PRN and with the PVP, he could hope to augment stability by 
deterring his adversaries from attempting to overthrow his regime. Or he could offer a series of 
concessions in the hopes of gaining the consent of opposition moderates to the existence of his 
regime. Though this course of action would intensify conflicts within the government, it raised 
the possibility of reaching an accommodation with opposition moderates that might outflank 
both pro- and antigovernment hardliners. Regardless of whether such an arrangement led to the 
formation of a coalition between the president and opposition moderates, it would increase the 
stability of his government by proving that opposition moderates had more to gain by co-
operating than by confronting President Picado Michalski. 
 
The Logic of the Political Stability Thesis: An explanation based upon the interest in political 
stability shared by President Picado Michalski therefore contends that calderonistas did not block 
the passage of the Electoral Code because they feared the consequences of inaction more than 
the effects of reform. To demonstrate the plausibility of this interpretation, I model the dilemma 
faced by the calderonista faction of the PRN as a game in extensive form, a game-theoretic 
device that delineates the strategies and outcomes of decisions made by two or more players. I 
then present an expected utility analysis, using an assessment of the opposition's chances of 
capturing state power through the use of force produced by Leon Cortés Castro—a former 
president (1936-40) and the leader of the main opposition party, the PD—to identify the 
advantages and disadvantages of electoral reform for both calderonistas and their adversaries. 
 
A Game in Extensive Form: Figure 3 demonstrates the consequences of supporting or opposing 
electoral reform for calderonistas. The bottom row lists the outcomes possible, given the 
response of the opposition to the choices made by calderonistas. I have ranked these outcomes 
for calderonistas and the opposition. A low number represents a worse outcome than a higher 
number. No claim is made that these numbers reflect, with any degree of precision, the value of 
outcomes for the players. 
 
The best outcome for calderonistas consisted of having the opposition accept their failure to 
support the passage of the electoral reform (outcome D). Their next best outcome was trouncing 
their opponents, whether because the opposition attacked the government in retaliation for the 
calderonista-sponsored defeat of the Electoral Code (outcome F) or simply because it, for 
example, had hoped to eliminate the presence of calderonistas within the political arena 
(outcome B). Outcomes B and F were inferior to D because a war promised to end with the 
destruction of the lives and property of an undesignated number of their followers. The very 
worst outcomes for calderonistas were those in which they lost their political predominance 
because they were defeated in a war started by their opponents, regardless of whether they had 
voted in favour of electoral reform (outcome A) or because they had not (outcome E). Endorsing 
electoral reform approved by the opposition only, however, represented a marginally superior 
outcome to military defeat (outcome C). Backing electoral reform, with the support of the 
opposition, thus threatened to reduce the share of state power 
 
held by the PRN. Doing so at least allowed the PRN to avoid the virtual certainty of their 
political extinction should they be defeated by their adversaries in a civil war. 
 
The best outcomes for the opposition consisted of successful rebellions against the government, 
regardless of whether calderonistas endorsed (outcome A) or blocked (outcome E) electoral 
reform. The opposition preferred these outcomes to support for an Electoral Code approved by 
calderonistas (outcome C), because reform implied compromise with their political rivals. Even 
if its control of the legislature expanded as a result of an effective system of electoral safeguards, 
the opposition would still have to share power with the calderonista and other factions of the 
PRN. Acknowledging that calderonistas had supported electoral reform, however, was preferable 
to not protesting a successful attempt by calderonistas to block passage of the Electoral Code 
(outcome D). Military inaction accompanied by electoral reform at least promised to increase 
their representation in Congress: without a set of electoral guarantees, the opposition's decision 
to maintain the peace would demonstrate its weakness and possibly alienate many of its support-
ers. The worst outcomes for the opposition consisted of losing a war it started, regardless of 
whether calderonistas endorsed the Electoral Code (outcome B) or prevented its promulgation 
(outcome F). 
 
The evaluation of alternative outcomes does not identify the most rational and mutually-
acceptable course of action for calderonistas and their adversaries' Indeed, modelling the 
consequences of the choices facing these parties indicates that their preferences over institutions 
diverged. Calderonistas feared the effects of electoral reform and wished to hamstring the 
president into implementing policies that preserved their hold on the political system. The 
opposition wanted genuine institutional change in order to expand its minimal control of the 
political system. Why, though, did so many pro-government deputies join their adversaries in 
supporting the Electoral Code? 
 
Expected Utility Calculations: Discussing expectations regarding the outcome of an armed 
clash between pro- and anti-government forces makes this question even more perplexing. Since 
his defeat in the 1944 presidential elections, Cortés Castro had reiterated his belief that 
attempting to overthrow the government was futile' His most eloquent statement of the 
opposition's possibility of success on the battlefield was published on 6 March 1946, three days 
after his unexpected death. Addressing opposition hardliners, Cortés Castro rhetorically asked 
whether `the country was ready to begin armed resistance' against the government. He answered 
by reminding his intransigent colleagues that: 
 
We cannot organize a defenseless country for a riot or a rebellion that would be massacred by the 
holders of state power who are the owners of the arms destined to defend the Republic and, in this 
case, would serve to send the citizens, who are the real defenders of the Republic, to the 
slaughterhouse. 
 
As the preponderance of military power was held by the government, Cortés Castro realized the 
use of force was an unviable option for the opposition. This was why, the ex-president said 
(Cortes Castro, 6 March 1946), he had: 
 
refused to listen to suggestions of violence, which could only merit the support of sensible Costa 
Ricans when such requests were backed by adequate preparations so that armed protest would 
have some probability of reasonable success and would not simply become a pointless spilling of 
Costa Rican blood. 
If Cortés Castro's estimate serves as an indication of the expected outcome of a war between pro- 
and anti-government forces, scuttling electoral reform was in the best interests of the 
calderonistas. 
 
Yet calderonistas no doubt knew that blocking electoral reform would encourage moderates to 
join opposition hardliners in support of a well-planned insurrection. Since late 1944, Cortés 
Castro had been negotiating with hardline critics of the government to form a broad opposition 
front, despite the unwillingness of most hardliners to compromise with the government 
(Lehoucq, 1992, pp. 247-74). It was no secret that Picado Michalski's sponsorship of the 
Electoral Code was motivated, in large part, by his interest in expanding the moderate 
opposition's stake in the political system and thus in stability. 
 
In the absence of genuine electoral reform, then, the probability that the opposition might prevail 
in an armed conflict would increase because opposition moderates would have few other 
alternatives but to endorse the efforts of hardliners to overthrow the government through the 
force of arms. Should this outcome obtain, calderonistas must have realized that Picado 
Michalski's government could split: officers and soldiers loyal to the president might decide to 
side with the opposition, especially if odds appeared to suggest that such an alliance would 
succeed. Thwarting reforms thus aggravated political tensions and only postponed the outbreak 
of violence among political forces. 
 
The fear of being outflanked and possibly overwhelmed by their rivals thus presumably 
convinced calderonistas, as the political stability thesis asserts, to support electoral reform. 
Calderonistas did not block electoral reform because the uncertainty of winning a war begun by 
the opposition, should they veto electoral reform, was greater than triumphing in a war started by 
the opposition, should supporters of the ex-president endorse electoral reform. Faced with this 
set of alternatives, many calderonistas found the consequences of electoral reform less intol-
erable than those of legislative inaction. 
 
Some Corroborating Evidence: Three important events and trends during the eight-month 
period prior to the February 1946 elections are consistent with this analysis. First, calderonista 
support of electoral reform did occur as reports became more prevalent that hardline members of 
the opposition were plotting against the government. Secondly, this interpretation of the 
promulgation of the Electoral Code is the only one of the three models of electoral reform that 
can make sense of the puzzling decision made by several PD deputies to support the re-
establishment of the public franchise. Thirdly, important evidence exists that President Picado 
Michalski considered distancing himself from the calderonistas unless they endorsed his efforts, 
as implied by my expected utility analysis of electoral reform. 
 
During most of 1944 and 1945, the US Ambassador, Hallet Johnson, sporadically mailed reports 
to his superiors in Washington, DC, about rumours that opposition hardliners were planning to 
overthrow the government. From late December 1945 until the mid-term elections took place, all 
of his despatches on domestic political alignments discussed the possibility that the opposition 
might use violence, especially if elections were held without the safeguards deemed necessary by 
Picado Michalski's opponents. 
 
That Picado Michalski, by the latter half of 1945, faced the choice of either furnishing electoral 
guarantees or confronting a rebellion was revealed in a conversation held between the 
ambassador, two of his secretaries and three members of the opposition about the options being 
discussed by the opposition as a whole. Roberto Salazar Mata (a respected member of the 
opposition), Manuel Castro Quesada (an opposition hardliner), and Ricardo Castro Beeche 
(Cortés Castro's campaign manager in the 1944 election) informed the ambassador and his staff 
that, in the words of the embassy scribe, even opposition moderates would consider `resorting to 
violence' unless 'every available means of brining about free elections in February' proved 
successful (Johnson, 27 November 1945). 
 
An indirect indicator of the plausibility of the expected utility analysis of the enactment of the 
1946 Electoral Code is that approximately a third of all PD deputies voted to rescind the secret 
franchise—an acid test, as previously shown, useful for gauging support for this bill in Congress. 
According to Deputy Cortés Fernandez, the opposition remained split on the utility of retaining 
the secret franchise because many believed that public voting would increase the ability of the 
opposition to detect the government's efforts to stuff the ballot boxes (La prensa libre, 2 October 
1945a & b). 
 
Deputy Mora Valverde, nominal leader of the PVP, interpreted the opposition's behaviour as a 
ploy by Cortés Castro to prevent the passage of the Electoral Code. He reasoned that the failure 
of electoral reform bolstered the former president's political standing by demonstrating the 
government's lack of commitment to resolve its dispute with the opposition in a peaceful manner 
(CC. ES No. 11 (2 October 1945), art. 3). It seems as if Mora Valverde recognized, in line with 
an expected utility analysis of the Electoral Code, that the absence of fundamental reforms would 
strengthen the position of opposition hardliners by widening the breach between the government 
and its critics. Thus, even if under existing legislation the secret franchise only encouraged 
efforts to modify vote totals covertly, Deputy Cortes Fernandez did not explain why it would 
cease to do so when coupled with the other safeguards contained in the Electoral Code. 
 
Finally, recently published memoirs and declassified US State Department documents reveal that 
President Picado Michalski was aware of the strategic advantages of enacting the Electoral Code. 
Since his election to the presidency, Picado Michalski had been courting anti-government as well 
as neutral capitalists and opposition moderates in an effort to free himself from dependence on 
the calderonistas faction of the PRN and the PVP and to arrest the development of an emerging 
political crisis (Lehoucq, 1992, pp. 144-7). 
 
Though President Picado Michalski reaffirmed his links with the calderonistas and the PVP, key 
members of his government apparently did not forgo opportunities to reach an accommodation 
with the opposition. Secretary of the Interior, Soto Harrison (1991, pp. 194-5), attempted to 
convince the president to replace calderonista military officers with politically-neutral 
individuals as a way of asserting his control over the armed forces and hence constructing a 
foundation upon which an accommodation with the opposition could be built. To help the 
president accomplish these objectives, Soto Harrison informed the president that he had spoken 
with Victor Guardia Quirós (a politically prominent lawyer and Supreme Court Magistrate) and 
Luis Uribe Rodriguez ( a leading merchant based in San Jose), who had each agreed to assume 
the command of the Artillery and Bella Vista Barracks, respectively. Soto Harrison also told 
Hallet Johnson, the US Ambassador to Costa Rica, that he had advised the president to distance 
himself from the calderonistas by allowing their opponents to win the 1946 mid-term elections. 
Letting the opposition gain control of Congress, argued Soto Harrison, would allow the president 
to play the calderonistas and opposition against each other (Johnson, 19 November 1945, 
especially pp. 3-4). 
 
The key to unlocking the deadlock between the government and the opposition thus belonged to 
President Picado Michalski. By proposing electoral reform, Picado Michalski would be able to 
identify his enemies. If calderonistas blocked the passage of electoral reform which provoked an 
insurrection, the president could join forces with the opposition. If the calderonistas endorsed 
electoral reform and the opposition nevertheless rebelled, he then could reaffirm his links with 
calderonismo. In both cases, he would improve his standing in political affairs by demonstrating 
his commitment to democratic reform and his independence from the calderonista political 
machine. Many calderonista deputies must have realized that the failure to help Picado Michalski 
placate opposition moderates threatened to trigger the formation of a tacit alliance between 
President Picado Michalski, opposition moderates and opposition hardliners. 
 
The Enactment of the 1946 Costa Rican Electoral Code: A Synthesis of Existing Findings 
This analysis discloses that the 1946 Electoral Code was either supported or approved by 
politicians facing a variety of constraints. As the first model asserts, the desire to maximize the 
interests of their party prompted a majority of PRN deputies—especially those loyal to Calderón 
Guardia—to oppose the reform bill. The same interests encouraged most PD—the principal 
opposition party—to back the Electoral Code. Despite their support of most of the PRN's 
policies, the PVP— the Costa Rican communist party—also fought for a bill that promised to 
free itself from the need to curry the favour of the official party, the PRN. 
 
That many deputies were elected with support from political machines that had become adept at 
manufacturing votes suggests that both pro- and anti-government deputies were furnished as the 
second model asserts, with yet additional reasons to vote against electoral reform. The desire to 
protect locally-based political machines may also contribute to explaining why a small number 
of PD legislators paradoxically opposed a bill ostensibly in the interests of their party. 
 
Only the third model, stressing the beneficial impact of reform on political stability, can explain 
President Picado Michalski's sponsorship of the Electoral Code. Despite being beholden to the 
PRN and the calderonista machine, President Picado Michalski in part launched the Electoral 
Code to free himself from dependence on the party and machine led by his predecessor, Calderón 
Guardia. By gaining legislative approval of this radical electoral reform bill, Picado Michalski 
could begin to fashion a new coalition between pro- and anti-government moderates and, as a 
result, to isolate PD and PRN hardliners in political competition. The president also backed the 
Electoral Code because he feared the consequences of not doing so: unless he allayed opposition 
fears that the PRN would never relinquish control of the state, he faced the possibility of being 
overthrown by a coalition formed between opposition hardliners and moderates. The reform of 
existing electoral laws in Costa Rica thus represented an exercise in damage limitation: 
important sectors of the ruling bloc recognized that ceding power to the opposition—the most 
likely effect of electoral reform—was preferable to heightened political uncertainty and the 
probable outbreak of civil war. 
 
Conclusions and Implications 
In this article, I have sought to understand why incumbents enact electoral laws that, given 
expectations about the performance of pro- and anti-government parties, threaten to eliminate 
their control of executive and legislative offices. I attempted to shed light on this puzzle by 
evaluating three models of political behaviour in the light of the evidence available about the 
origins of the 1946 Costa Rican Electoral Code. I now conclude by identifying two implications 
raised by my analysis—one of which concerns theories of institutional change and the other 
which raises questions about the received wisdom regarding subsequent political events in Costa 
Rican politics. 
 
The first implication of my findings is that invalid conclusions about the nature of institutional 
reform will be drawn by assuming that politicians only seek to promote their interests in one 
political arena. The interest all parties possess, for example, in maximizing their share of 
legislative seats—especially in a parliamentary system—does not mean that their behaviour is 
solely determined by the desire to build and maintain legislative majorities. The pursuit of this 
objective may conflict—as it did in Costa Rica during the mid-1940s—with the electorally-
driven need of some deputies to protect the interests of their political machines. Most 
importantly, it may clash with the interests of key sectors of the ruling bloc seeking to placate 
opposition demands for a greater share of state authority. 
 
Only by recognizing that the promulgation of the 1946 Costa Rican Electoral Code was part of a 
more encompassing set of agreements negotiated between President Picado Michalski and 
opposition moderates can the behaviour of pro- and anti-government congressmen by understood 
(Lehoucq, 1992, pp. 247-70). That President Picado Michalski and calderonista PRN deputies 
supported electoral reform because they feared the consequences of inaction more than that of 
reform underscores the claim that institutional reforms are products of strategic calculations 
similar to those made when politicians enact ordinary laws and public policies. Both types of 
decisions require politicians to assess the impact of proposed legislation on their interests (Riker, 
1980; Sened, 1991; Shepsle, 1986). Decisions to endorse or to reject institutional reforms differ 
from those motivating support for or opposition to more mundane types of legislation because 
they often mean that politicians must weigh the strengths and liabilities of institutional change on 
their interests as, for example, members of parties, of political machines and of the ruling bloc' 
More often than not, institutional change forces politicians to trade benefits in some arenas for 
losses in others. 
 
Contrary to sociological accounts of institutional change, explanations of electoral reform do not 
necessarily require extensive discussion of the preferences held by politicians. My interpretation 
of the origins of the 1946 Costa Rican Electoral Code, in fact, suggests that such accounts of 
electoral reform often dismiss rational choice explanations of institutional change because they 
discover that the legislative maximization model of reform is inadequate. Yet, as Tsebelis (1990) 
points out, a more thorough specification of the constraints faced by politicians yields models of 
reform that can furnish comprehensive accounts of institutional reform' 
These thoughts do not imply, however, that studying the origins and development of preferences 
are unimportant. Especially in conditions of uncertainty, the perceptions and historical baggage 
carried by politicians can shape their decision- making. Even when political forces know a great 
deal about their environment, knowledge of their perceptions remains an important part of the 
story of electoral reform. My analysis thus suggests that the preferences of politicians may be 
shaped more by strategic considerations than critics of rational choice explanations may care to 
admit. 
 
The final implication of my analysis is that, contrary to prevailing accounts, the 1948 civil war 
was not inevitable once Picado Michalski became president of Costa Rica in 1944.
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fraud sponsored by his predecessor was responsible for his political victory—which remains a 
highly debatable proposition (Lehoucq, 1992, pp. 187-94)—Picado Michalski was not a stooge 
of the political machine led by Calderón Guardia. That he sought to reform electoral laws shows 
that he recognized that establishing the independence of his government was indispensable for its 
survival. The passage of the Electoral Code demonstrates that the president and important 
opposition politicians wished to prevent the outbreak of hostilities that many—but not all—
wished to avoid. 
 
Ultimately, the president's efforts to create a mutual understanding with the opposition failed 
(Lehoucq, 1992, chaps. 6-7). The death of Cortés Castro in March 1946 decapitated opposition 
moderates; no other leader with as large a popular following could bargain with a government 
many believed would never willingly relinquish control of the state. In their struggle to become 
leaders of the opposition, hardliners like Figueres Ferrer and Ulate Blanco discredited all those 
who still wished to cooperate instead of confront Picado Michalski's government. Once Calderón 
Guardia decided to run for the presidency in late 1946, the relations between government and 
opposition polarized. Allegedly won by Ulate Blanco, the 1948 presidential elections were 
followed by intense negotiations that failed to resolve the differences regarding political 
succession. An army led by Figueres Ferrer ultimately triumphed in the ensuing civil war 
between the government and its opponents. 
 
Notes 
1. A revised version of the 1946 Electoral Code was produced in the aftermath of the 1948 
Civil War and the ensuing 1949 National Constituent Assembly. The modifications were 
required to ensure that the Electoral Code was not inconsistent with the Constituent 
Assembly's decision to endow the electoral tribunal—which they named the Supreme 
Tribunal of Elections—with sole authority for the organization of elections and the tally 
of the vote. An overview of this institution's place in the Costa Rican political system is 
furnished by Murillo (1983) and Villegas Antillón (1987). Slightly more will be said of 
electoral tribunals and the relationship between presidential incumbents and the organi-
zation of elections in subsequent sections of this article' 
2. Given the propensity of US Congressmen and state legislators to create advantages for 
themselves (for example, gerrymandering districts and using mailing and other privileges 
to communicate with their constituents), I find it odd that so little work has been done on 
how incumbents design institutions to insulate themselves from the rigours of electoral 
competition. For some exceptions, see Grofman, Lijphart, McKay and Scarrow (1982) as 
well as Grofman (1990)' 
3. Downs (1957) was the first to develop a deductive theory about the office-seeking inter-
ests of political parties. Downs' model, along with subsequent reformulations of his 
theory, are discussed in Schlesinger (1991), Strom (1990) and Wittman (1983). 
4. The Organic Law of the Civic Registry was written by Victor Guardia Quirós, José Maria 
Vargas Pacheco and Alfredo Zúñiga Pages. It was printed in La tribuna, No. 7,332 (18 
March 1945). This committee's introductory remarks on their draft project was published 
in La tribuna, No' 7,334 (16 March 1945), p. 7' An incomplete version of the latter is 
contained in Soto Harrison (1991, pp. 197-206)' 
5. Identifying the date of origin of this system in Costa Rica is difficult. The 1893 Law of 
Elections introduced proportional representation to Costa Rica for those provincial 
districts that sent three or more representatives to Congress. Parties were entrusted with 
the responsibility of furnishing voters with ballots which citizens were free to amend as 
they saw fit on election day. Governments began to supply voters with ballots containing 
the list of candidates submitted by registered parties since 1927' 
6. By mid-1947, PVP deputies succeeded in enacting a law lowering this threshold to 50 per 
cent. See 'Ley No. 1096 (27 August 1947)'' 
7. The 1949 National Constituent Assembly maintained these reforms, and made the TNE's 
verdict the official tally of elections. 
8. I could not consult the minutes of sessions produced by Congress itself because they are 
neither available in the National Archives nor in the Library of the Legislative Assembly 
(in 1949, delegates attending the National Constituent Assembly devised a new name for 
the legislative branch of their government). Found in the National Archives (Washington, 
DC), US diplomatic files on the internal affairs of Costa Rica include forecasts of Costa 
Rican politics made by Embassy officers and summaries of Costa Rican newspapers and 
documents. Most importantly, they present transcripts of interviews with Costa Rican 
officials and politicians—information rarely to be found in other primary sources. 
9. These reforms were proposed by PD Deputies Fernando Lara Bustamente and Eladio 
Trejos (Proyecto (23 November 1945)). They were approved by a multiparty committee 
five days later (Dictamen de la Comisión de Legislación (28 November 1945)' These 
reforms were endorsed in the third and final debate on 5 December (CC, ES No' 57)' 
10. Furthermore, Lehoucq (1991; 1992, pp. 118-38, 194-200) shows that economic and 
social policies pursued by both presidents helped as well as harmed the interests of the 
dominant class. Accounts which contend that the 1948 civil war was the culmination of 
numerous disagreements between social reformist governments and a conservative 
opposition aligned with the Costa Rican oligarchy thus rest upon a misleading, if not 
inaccurate set of premises. 
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